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COMMUNICATIONS LAW: U.S. WEST, INC. V. FCC
INTERPRETS THE FIRST AMENDMENT RAMIFICATIONS OF
"CUSTOMER PROPRIETARY NETWORK INFORMATION"
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most broad-sweeping piece of legislation of the last dec-
ade, the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996' ("Telecom Act"),
radically altered the competitive landscape of the telecommunications
market. Essentially, the Telecom Act attempts to level the playing field
long held by government-sanctioned monopolist telephone companies.
The Act requires infrastructure sharing among competitors, restrains
certain markets for Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs")3 , and limits the
4
role of state and local governments. At the same time, the Telecom Act
balances the interests of consumers who need affordable telecommuni-
cations service provided on a "universal" basis.'
As the decade ends, however, courts struggle to interpret the Telecom
Act in ways consistent with the intent of Congress, while being fair to the
parties before them.6 Perhaps further complicating this mix of issues is
the broad scope of power given the Federal Communication Commission
("FCC") to interpret and enforce the Telecom Act.7
The FCC's regulations concerning the use of "Customer Proprietary
Network Information" ("CPNI")8 promulgated pursuant to section 222 of
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 100 Stat. 56 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (Supp. I1 1997)).
2. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252, 259 (Supp. III 1997).
3. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-276. BOCs are those local telephone companies formerly part of the
Bell Company monopoly. U.S. West Communications Company, for example, is a BOC. See id. §
153(4).
4. See id. § 253.
5. See id. § 254 (discussing quality, rates, and access); see also § 255 (discussing disability
access).
6. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1999).
7. See 47 U.S.C. § 401(c) (granting the FCC discretionary forbearance of any regulation
compelled under the Telecom Act).
8. 47 C.F.R. § 64.2003(c) (1998).
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the Telecom Act 9 recently came within the purview of the Tenth Circuit
in U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC.'0 This comment discusses the Tenth Circuit's
decision in U.S. West. First, this comment provides some background
information on CPNI and its relationship to the telecommunications in-
dustry. This comment then examines the First Amendment issues ad-
dressed in U.S. West. By way of reference, this comment also explores
recent First Amendment cases in other circuits. Finally, this comment
attempts to draw a distinction between those cases and the Tenth Cir-
cuit's First Amendment analysis in U.S. West.
I. CUSTOMER PROPRIETARY NETWORK INFORMATION
A. Background
Generally stated, "CPNI is information about a telephone customer's
use of the telephone network, such as the number of lines ordered, serv-
ice location, type and class of services purchased, usage levels, and call-
ing patterns."" The Telecom Act defines CPNI as:
(A) information that relates to the quantity, technical configu-
ration, type, destination, and amount of use of a telecommuni-
cations service subscribed to by any customer of a telecommu-
nications carrier, and that is made available to the carrier by the
customer solely by virtue of the carrier-customer relationship;
and
(B) information contained in the bills pertaining to telephone
exchange service or telephone toll service received by a cus-
tomer of a carrier .... 12
Telecommunications carriers use CPNI for a variety of reasons. Most
importantly, however, CPNI is a valuable marketing tool. CPNI assists
telecommunications carriers in "identifying potential customers, design-
9. See 47 U.S.C. § 222; 47 C.F.R. § 2001.
10. 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
11. California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919,930 (9th Cir. 1994).
12. 47 U.S.C. § 222(0(1). Subscriber lists are defined as any information:
(A) identifying the listed names of subscribers of a carrier and such subscrib-
ers' telephone numbers, addresses, or primary advertising classifications (as
such classifications are assigned at the time of the establishment of such
service), or any combination of such listed names, numbers, addresses, or
classifications; and
(B) that the carrier or an affiliate has published, caused to be published, or ac-
cepted for publication in any directory format.
id. § 222(f)(3). Mere lists of subscribers are specifically excluded from CPNI, and the reader is
cautioned not to confuse the two. See id. § 222(f)(1). Indeed, disclosure of subscriber lists, such




ing more efficient services, and better meeting customer needs." BOCs
and competitor service providers use CPNI in their development and'4
marketing of services. Put simply, CPNI can be manipulated into cre-
ating a very accurate and highly detailed direct marketing list."
By way of an example, suppose U.S. West knows through aggregate
demographics that local telephone service customers who call Philadel-
phia generally also call Trenton. If U.S. West develops a new Trenton
market, it can use CPNI to tailor its pricing, service plan, and marketing
campaign particularly to an individual local telephone service customer.1'
Moreover, as an incumbent local exchange carrier, U.S. West possesses a
broad customer base and detailed CPNI. Absent regulation to the con-
trary, U.S. West can use its CPNI to market to individual customers any
advance in service or technology in a more effective and less expensive
manner than its competitors.
CPNI creates privacy issues in addition to the competitive advantages
garnered through its use.' Absent regulation to the contrary, U.S. West
can sell CPNI at monopoly prices to its competitors without regard to the
wishes of its customers. This means that all the potentially private infor-
mation appearing on a customer bill - whom she called, when, and how
often - could be freely disseminated to any carrier willing to pay the
price.' 8 In other words, CPNI would no longer be proprietary informa-
tion.
Because of the implications to customer privacy, the federal govern-
ment has long regulated CPNI. '9 To protect the proprietary and privacy
interests of consumers, the FCC permitted the BOCs unrestricted access
to CPNI by any of BOC's telephone customer unless the customer spe-• 20
cifically opted-out and requested confidentiality. However, competitive
21
carriers had to obtain customer authorization to gain access to CPNI.
This opt-out regulation proved ineffective. The customer could pre-
vent her telephone company from disclosing her CPNI to the other car-
13. California, 39 F.3d at 930. Telecommunications services are divided into two very general
categories. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1227, 1223 n.3 ( 9th Cir. 1990). "Basic service" is local
exchange service. California, 905 F.2d at 1223 n.3. "Enhanced services" include everything else
such as long distance service, voice mail, and call forwarding. Id. at 1226.
14. See California, 39 F.3d at 930.
15. See id.
16. See generally U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1230 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing
how carriers can utilize CPNI information to market products to customers).
17. See 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (Supp. 111. 1997).
18. See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1229 n.I.
19. See id. at 1229 (discussing past government restrictions on CPNI disclosures).
20. See California, 39 F.3d at 930.
21. See id.
20001 443
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rier only by specifically requesting confidentiality.22 Many customers
were not notified of their option to request confidentiality,23 did not un-
derstand their rights to opt-out or failed to opt-out even if they wanted
their confidentiality preserved. 24
The prior CPNI regulation created a competitive disadvantage as
well. BOCs had unrestricted access to CPNI "by default" while other
carriers had to obtain customer authorization before the carriers were
permitted access to CPNI. Thus, consumer inertia had to be overcome
for other carriers to gain access to CPNI. The FCC amended these rules
before enactment of the Telecom Act by requiring competitive carriers to
26
receive authorization from customers only with 20 lines or less.
As indicated above, section 222 represents the Telecom Act's re-
sponse to CPNI. Like most of the Telecom Act, section 222 asserts the
interests of the government in creating a competitive environment by
placing restraints on carriers possessing another carrier's CPNI. 7  As
such, section 222 requires all carriers to keep confidential the CPNI of
28
other telecommunication carriers. If a carrier receives proprietary in-
formation from another carrier in the course of business, it is required to
use the information only for the intended purpose, not for its own mar-
29
keting purposes.
Following in the tradition of previous CPNI regulation, section 222
also provides safeguards for consumers who want private information
gained about them through their use of telecommunications to be kept
confidential. 3° Specifically, section 222 provides that:
[e]xcept as required by law or with the approval of the cus-
tomer, a telecommunications carrier . . . shall only use, dis-
close, or permit access to individually identifiable customer
proprietary network information in its provision of (A) the tele-
communications service from which such information is de-
rived, or (B) services necessary to, or used in, the provision of
22. See id.
23. See id. This "customer notification" is essentially the same "opt-out" plan that so
captivates the Tenth Circuit majority in U.S. West. See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 123-39.
24. See generally Computer III, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571, 7606-07 (FCC 1991) (Order on Remand)
(acknowledging the failure of customers to understand or respond to notices discussing CPNI
disclosures).
25. California, 39 F.3d at 930.
26. See id.
27. See 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1), (3) (Supp. III 1997).
28. 47 U.S.C. § 222(a).
29. Id. § 222(b).
30. See id. § 222(c)(1).
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such telecommunications service, including the publishing of
directories.3
Upon an "affirmative written request by the customer" a telecommuni-
cations carrier must disclose customer proprietary network information
to any person so "designated by the customer.
3 2
Section 222 also recognizes the value of CPNI as a marketing tool
and as a sellable commodity. To this end, section 222 only restrains the
use of individual CPNI. All carriers are free to "use, disclose or permit
access to aggregate customer information."" Even incumbent local ex-
change carriers, who generally are prevented from using their market
advantages, may also "use, disclose, or permit access to aggregate cus-
tomer information" if they provide such aggregate information on a "rea-
34
sonable and nondiscriminatory" basis. CPNI in a demographic or com-
piled form is freely transferable.35 As a result, carriers may use aggregate
information to design marketing campaigns, tailor services, or compile
and sell the demographic information of its customer base. Of course,
carriers are also allowed to use CPNI to collect fees for services ren-
dered, "to protect the rights or property of the carrier," or to provide
36
customer services at the customer's request.
Section 222 is not the only constraint on the use of CPNI. In 1998,
the FCC released an order interpreting and promulgating regulations
pursuant to section 222. 37 Essentially, the FCC divided the affected tele-
communications services into three categories: local, interexchange (long
distance), and commercial mobile radio services ("CMRS"). Carriers
may use or disclose CPNI to market primary or ancillary services within
a category to customers who already subscribe within that category.39
Generally, carriers are not permitted to share CPNI among their affiliates
without customer approval. 4° However, if a customer subscribes to serv-
ices in more than one category from the same carrier, the carrier may
4'
share CPNI even if an affiliated company offers one of the services.
31. id.
32. Id. § 222(c)(2).
33. Id. § 222(c)(3). Aggregate customer information is defined as "collective data that relates
to a group or category of services or customers, from which individual customer identities and
characteristics have been removed." Id. § 222(0(2).
34. Id. § 222(c)(3).
35. See id. § 222(c).
36. Id. § 222(d).
37. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.2000-2009 (1998).
38. 47 C.F.R. § 64.2005(a); see HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DiCTIONARY 177
(15th ed. 1999) (noting that CMRS is an acronym for "commercial mobile radio service").
39. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.2005(a).
40. See id. § 64.2005(b).
41. See id. § 64.2005(a)(1).
2001
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In addition, carriers may not use or disclose CPNI to track calls to com-
42 43
petitors, to regain customers who have switched providers, or to pro-
vide customer premises equipment ("CPE") or information services, such
as call answering, voice mail, and Internet access without customer ap-
proval. "However, carriers may, without customer approval, use or dis-41
close CPNI to provide hardware services, to research "health effects of
CMRS," 46 or to market closely-related ancillary services such as speed
dialing, directory assistance, call return, call waiting, and caller I.D.47
Customer approval may be acquired by any method convenient to the
carrier, including oral or electronic means.4 ' Before soliciting approval,
the carrier must provide the customer with a "one-time notification,"
49
containing, among other specific requirements, sufficient information to
make an "informed decision."50 In addition, the notification must inform
the customer of her right to confidentiality.5" Carriers must keep records52
of notification for at least one year, and the carrier bears the burden of53
demonstrating that approval was given. Once given, customer approvals
remain in effect until limited in scope or revoked. The FCC also re-
quires carriers to set in place procedural and technical safeguards to pro-
tect against the inadvertent dissemination of CPNI.5'
42. See id. § 64.2005(b)(2).
43. See id. § 64.2005(b)(3).
44. See id. § 64.2005(b)(1). CPE refers to telephone equipment such as "key systems, PBXs,
[and] answering machines," which reside on the customer's premises. HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S
TELECOM DICTIONARY 204 (15th ed. 1999). As used here, '"premises' might be anything from an
office to a factory to a home." Id. CPE is also known as "customer provided equipment"; the two
terms are interchangeable. See id.
45. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.2005(c)(1) (1998). Hardware services are "inside wiring installation,
maintenance, and repair services." Id.
46. 47 C.F.R. § 64.2005(c)(2).
47. Id. § 64.2005(c)(3).
48. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.2007(b).
49. Id. § 64.2007(f).
50. Id. § 64.2007(f)(2).
51. See id. § 64.2007(f)(2)(i).
52. See id. § 64.2007(e).
53. See id. § 64.2007(c).
54. See id. § 64.2007(d).
55. See id. § 64.2009(a)-(e) (including, among other things, developing and implementing
software, training personnel, establishing supervisory procedures and providing for annual officer
approval of compliance measures).
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B. U.S. West v. Federal Communications Commission
1. Facts
U.S. West challenged the FCC's regulations discussed above, claim-
ing that the regulations "violate[d] the First Amendment by restricting its
ability to engage in commercial speech with customers."" The FCC de-
fended its regulations by asserting that CPNI regulations did not impli-
cate any constitutional concerns, were reasonable, and thus were "enti-
tled to deference" under a Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc." analysis."'
2. Decision
Although courts usually employ Chevron when an agency's interpre-
tive regulations are challenged, the Tenth Circuit refused to apply Chev-
ron until it resolved the constitutional challenge.59 "[I]f we determine that
the FCC's customer approval rule presents a serious or grave constitu-
tional question, we will owe the FCC no deference, even if its CPNI
regulations are otherwise reasonable, and will apply the rule of constitu-
tional doubt."'
Having decided that the CPNI regulations raised a constitutional
question, the Tenth Circuit first turned to the question of whether the
CPNI regulations restricted protected speech.6' The FCC argued that the
CPNI regulations did not implicate speech at all." Instead, the FCC con-
tended, the regulations merely prohibit the manner in which a carrier
61
uses CPNI to target its marketing scheme.
The court rejected this argument, saying that a restriction on the abil-
ity of either component of speech - the speaker or the audience - was a
56. U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1230 (10th Cir. 1999). The First Amendment
states, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
U.S. West also asserted a Fifth Amendment violation "because CPNI represents valuable property
that belongs to the carriers and the regulations greatly diminish its value." U.S. West, 182 F.3d at
1230. However, the Tenth Circuit's discussion in this case focused primarily on the impact on
commercial speech, and so the discussion in this Note shall be similarly limited in scope. See id. at
1239 n.14.
57. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
58. See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1231. The Chevron doctrine essentially states that when
Congress has expressly spoken to the precise question at issue, the court must give effect to the
express intent. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. However, "if the statute is silent or ambiguous," the
court must defer to the agency's interpretation if it is reasonable. See id. As a result, Chevron
provides a nearly perfect defense for most federal agency regulation because the regulation must be
unreasonable or unrelated to the statute for the court to overturn it.
59. See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1231.
60. id.
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restriction on free speech.64 "[A] restriction on speech tailored to a par-
ticular audience, 'targeted speech,' cannot be cured simply by the fact
that a speaker can speak to a larger indiscriminate audience. ,,6 The
court further observed that the mere fact that U.S. West had "alter-
native channels of communication" did not eradicate the restric-
66
tions on speech imposed by the CPNI regulations.
The Tenth Circuit next determined what type of speech the CPNI
67
regulations implicated. Because the speech targeted a carrier's custom-
ers for the purpose of soliciting those customers to purchase more or
different telecommunications services, the court reasoned that use of65
CPNI concerned a commercial transaction. As such, the CPNI regula-
69
tions targeted commercial speech.
Since non-misleading commercial speech is protected under the First
Amendment, the court applied a Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission0 analysis.7' In Central Hudson, the Supreme
Court set forth the test to determine whether a government restriction on72
commercial speech violates the First Amendment. First, it must be
73
determined if the expression is entitled to First Amendment protection.
Next, it must be determined if "the asserted governmental interest is
substantial ... whether the regulation directly advances the governmen-
tal interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is neces-
sary to serve that interest.
' 74
The FCC advanced two state interests, "protecting customer privacy
•. ,,71
and promoting competition. While the Tenth Circuit conceded that
these are legitimate and substantial interests "in the abstract," it none-
theless found that the FCC failed to build a record that adequately justi-
76




67. See id. at 1232-33.
68. See id. at 1232.
69. See id. at 1233.
70. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
71. See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1233-39.
72. See Central Hudson, Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
73. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. To be entitled to First Amendment protection,
commercial speech "must concern lawful activity and not be misleading." Id.
74. Id.




77FCC failed to articulate the exact privacy interests served. The courtset forth the government's burden as follows:
In the context of a speech restriction imposed to protect privacy
by keeping certain information confidential, the government
must show that the dissemination of the information desired to
be kept private would inflict specific and significant harm on
individuals, such as undue embarrassment or ridicule, intimi-
dation or harassment, or misappropriation of sensitive personal
information for the purposes of assuming another's identity.
78
A more "empirical explanation" was needed to justify the privacy79
interest. In addition, the court rebuffed any other privacy reasons as
being "[a] general level of discomfort from knowing that people can
readily access information about us" and that this discomfort "does not
necessarily rise to the level of a substantial state interest under Central
Hudson."' Notwithstanding these reservations, however, the court as-
sumed that the government's interest in preventing the dissemination of
"sensitive and potentially embarrassing personal information" was suffi-
cient to pass the first prong of Central Hudson."'
The Tenth Circuit expressed even more skepticism with the govern-82
ment's interest in promoting competition. "While the broad purpose of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is to foster increased competition in
the telecommunications industry .... Congress did not intend for com-
petition to be a significant purpose of § 222."" The Tenth Circuit's
skepticism stemmed from three observations. First, the court noted that
"the plain language of the section deals almost exclusively with privacy.•. ,85
[and] contains no explicit mention of competition." Second, the
77. See id. at 1235. Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit advances that privacy is not an "absolute
good" because of the "real costs" it imposes on society. Id. Indeed, the court notes that "privacy
'facilitates the dissemination of false information, . . . protects the withholding of relevant true
information, interferes with the collection, organization and storage of information' thus leading to
'reduced productivity and higher prices,' and even threatens physical safety by 'interfering with the
public's ability to access information needed to protect themselves."' Id. at 1235 n.7 (quoting FRED
H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 28-29 (1997)). One supposes, then, under the Tenth
Circuit's ruminations, if everyone's life were splayed out for all to see, analyze, and capitalize upon,
we could avoid all those pesky problems caused by people's annoying insistence at requiring the
government to protect our privacy.
78. Id. at 1235.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1235-36.
82. See id. at 1236.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id. The Tenth Circuit admits that "§ 222(c)(3) and § 222(e) impose nondiscrimination
requirements ... which could be construed as pro-competition measures" but incredibly finds "that
2000] 449
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Third, full CPNI use was allowed with customer approval.87 Neverthe-
less, the court decided that promoting competition, when combined with
the privacy interest, was sufficient to pass the first prong of Central Hud-
son even though increasing competition would not alone justify the CPNI
88
regulations.
The Tenth Circuit then turned to the second prong of the Central
Hudson test to determine whether the CPNI regulations would address
the interests in any material way.89 The court was unconvinced that the
CPNI regulations would alleviate the government's concerns since any
harm to privacy or competition absent the regulations was mere specula-
tion.9° The court further noted that it had "no indication of how [an inva-
sion of privacy] may occur in reality with respect to CPNI" or "that the
disclosure might actually occur."9' Additionally, the court dismissed as
"speculation" and "conjecture" the FCC's assertion that use of CPNI
information would impede competition. 92 Thus, the court found that the
FCC failed to satisfy Central Hudson's second prong.93
Although stating that the FCC's position was too deficient for a full
Central Hudson analysis, the Tenth Circuit proceeded to the last prong of
Central Hudson to further criticize the CPNI regulations for not being
sufficiently narrowly tailored.94 The court made much of the fact that the
FCC chose the "opt-in" over the "opt-out" procedure for obtaining cus-
tomer approval. 9' "[O]n this record, the FCC's failure to adequately con-
sider an obvious and substantially less restrictive alternative, an opt-out
strategy, indicates that it did not narrowly tailor the CPNI regulations
regarding customer approval." ' As a result, the Tenth Circuit held that at
the very least the CPNI regulations "raise a serious constitutional ques-
tion" and thus violated the First Amendment.9
these do not sufficiently indicate that increasing competition was a purpose of § 222." Id. at 1236-
37. See infra Part C for a discussion of the court's misplaced dismissal of the competition argument.
86. Id. at 1237.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)).
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1238.
93. See id. at 1237-38.
94. See id. at 1238.
95. Id. at 1238-39.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1240.
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In a vigorous dissent, Judge Briscoe advanced the position that the
CPNI are a reasonable interpretation of section 222 and that "neither of
the constitutional challenges asserted by U.S. West [are] serious enough
to warrant abandoning the traditional deference we grant agency inter-
pretations under Chevron."" Judge Briscoe condemned the majority's
view as "frustratingly vague" and flawed by "stray[ing] from the narrow
scope of the CPNI Order and effectively tak[ing] into account the statu-
tory restrictions on CPNI usage." 99 In other words, the majority confused
the FCC's role in promulgating interpretive regulation with the statute's100
requirements. Had the majority properly narrowed the scope of its in-
quiry, it would have applied a Chevron inquiry and the regulations would
be upheld.'0 '
C. Other Circuits
The other circuits have not yet ruled on the constitutionality of the
FCC's CPNI rules. However, the Tenth Circuit's holding in U.S. West is
analogous to the First Amendment analysis used by other circuits in con-
sidering commercial broadcasting decisions.
In Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company v. United States,102
the Fourth Circuit considered 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)(1) which prohibited a
local telephone company from offering cable television services to its
local telephone subscribers when the local telephone company retained
103
editorial control over the television services. Similar to the FCC's po-
sition in U.S. West, the governmental interest in Chesapeake was to re-
move the tempting incentive for local telephone companies to dominate
the cable television medium in their respective local markets.0
4
In considering section 533, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that a
remedy "'need not be the least-restrictive or least-intrusive means"' and
noted that the "requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the
... regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation."' The Fourth Circuit,
however, found that section 533 was not sufficiently tailored because the
government failed to demonstrate why the Section did not "'burden sub-
stantially more speech than is necessary.'"' ° If there are alternative
methods of communication available, those methods must be "suffi-
98. Id. at 1243.
99. Id. at 1244.
100. See id. at 1246-47.
101. See id.
102. 42 F.3d 181(4th Cir. 1994), vacated, 516 U.S. 415 (1996).
103. See Chesapeake, 42 F.3d at 185.
104. See id. at 198.
105. Id. at 199 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989)).
106. Id. at 202 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
2000]
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107
ciently similar" to methods prohibited by the statute. As a result, sec-
tion 533 failed to pass constitutional muster since "[t]he statute bars ab-
solutely the telephone companies from entering with [the ability to edit
program content] the cable television market."' 8
The Fifth Circuit similarly scrutinized broadcasting regulations in
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States."° Un-
der fire in that case was 18 U.S.C. § 1304, which prohibited television
stations from broadcasting advertisements for lotteries or gambling casi-
nos.110 Since the individual states could not effectively regulate the
broadcasts, the Unites States asserted that it had an interest in reducing
public participation in commercial lotteries and in protecting those states
that chose not to permit casino gambling within their borders."' The
Fifth Circuit struck the regulation outright and decided that "[l]ittle def-
erence can be accorded to the state's legislative determination that a
commercial speech restriction is no more onerous than necessary to serve
the government's interests."' 
12
The Ninth Circuit in Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States"3 also
addressed the advertising restrictions in 18 U.S.C. § 1304.14 Unlike the
Fifth Circuit, the court found the government's articulated interests to be
"substantial"" 5 and that the limitation on advertising appeared to directly116
advance those interests. The court nonetheless struck the prohibition
because the numerous exceptions contained in the statute "'directly un-
dermine[d] and counteract[ed] its effects."' 
17
Not all advertising or marketing regulations fail the test for restric-
tions on commercial speech. The Ninth Circuit addressed automated
telemarketing regulations in Moser v. FCC. "' Many companies had be-
gun using automated telemarketing, which engaged a computer to call
numbers sequentially on a list and played a pre-recorded advertisement
upon answer."' Consumers would have to wait until the end of the taped
107. Id. at 203.
108. Id.
109. 149 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 1923 (1999).
110. See Greater New Orleans Broad., 149 F.3d at 336.
11 . See id. at 338.
112. Id.
113. 107 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1997).
114. See Valley Broad. Co. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328, 1329-30 (9th Cir. 1997).
115. Valley Broad, 107 F.3d at 1332.
116. See id. at 1334.
117. Id. at 1335, 1336 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 489 (1995)).
118. 46 F.3d 970, 972 (9th Cir. 1995).
119. See Moser, 46 F.3d at 972.
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messages in order to remove their names from the calling lists."' Al-
though forty-one of the states had passed regulation limiting the use of
such automated telemarketing, the states asked for federal legislation
because they could not regulate interstate calls.' A provision of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 199122 banned prerecorded tele-
marketing calls because the volume of automated calls created a nuisance123
for consumers. The federal statute permitted the use of prerecorded
messages "only if a live operator introduce[d] the message or if the cus-
,124tomer consent[ed]."
The National Association of Telecomputer Operators ("NATO")
brought suit alleging that the law violated the First Amendment because
it was not "narrowly tailored to further a substantial government inter-
12 ,126
est.'"  Here, the government's interest was "residential privacy."
NATO asserted that the "ban on automated, commercial calls [was] un-
justified because there [was] no evidence that [commercial calls were]
more intrusive than either 'live' or noncommercial calls.'
127
128
The Ninth Circuit disagreed and upheld the statute. The court noted
that Congress made extensive findings based upon "'significant evi-
dence' before Congress of consumer concerns about telephone solicita-
tion[s] in general and about automated calls in particular." 29 Notably, the
court stated that
[t]he restrictions in the Act leave open many alternative chan-
nels of communication, including the use of taped messages
introduced by live speakers or taped messages to which con-
sumers have consented, as well as all live solicitation calls.
That some companies prefer the cost and efficiency of auto-
mated telemarketing does not prevent Congress from restricting
the practice.130
D. Analysis
As the broadcasting decisions from the Fourth and Fifth Circuits in-
dicate, the Tenth Circuit applied the proper First Amendment analysis
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994).
123. See Moser, 46 F.3d at 971-72.
124. Id. at 972.
125 Id. at 973.
126. Id. at 974.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 975.
129. Id. at 974.
130. Id. at 975.
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with the appropriate scrutiny. However, the Tenth Circuit's decision in
U.S. West is distinguishable from the other cases in several ways.
First, the Tenth Circuit appears to misapprehend CPNI. CPNI is not a
medium through which a speaker communicates to its audience like tele-
vision or radio'broadcasting. CPNI is not a means of communication or a
form of commercial speech and thus use of CPNI is distinguishable from
the broadcasting cases above.' 3' Seen in its simplest form, CPNI is a col-
lection of highly complicated and detailed data about telecommunica-
tions usage. Telecommunications carriers manipulate this data into
meaningful information in order to market services. In this respect, CPNI
is more like the automatic calling methods used in Moser, and thus not
deserving heightened scrutiny as commercial speech.13'
The Tenth Circuit also appears to misunderstand the competitive im-
port of CPNI as used by BOCs and other incumbent carriers. For a BOC,
CPNI represents a customer base and data collected through decades of
monopolistic power. A company like U.S. West need go no further than
its own local service database to market long distance services or other
ancillary services. As a result, U.S. West possesses a significant advan-
tage over competitive carriers.
In this respect, CPNI is perhaps best understood as infrastructure, like
poles or fiber optic cables. Carriers are required to share space on poles,
cables and other facilities with competing carriers since it would diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for another carrier to compete without this infra-
structure in place."'
Just like the poles or cables installed throughout its territory, U.S.
West's CPNI creates a market already in place for services it may offer
in addition to local service. A similar marketing effort would be ex-
tremely expensive for a carrier that lacked the same CPNI. If CPNI did
not involve individual customer data, the FCC could have required shar-
ing of CPNI just as it requires the sharing of facilities. For example, sub-
scriber lists or directory information must be shared among carriers.
Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit did not give proper weight to the
competitive value of CPNI nor did the court consider the particular tim-
ing of U.S. West's suit. Under the Telecom Act, BOCs are temporarily
restrained from offering long distance service until certain requirements
131. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 149 F.3d 334, 335-36 (5th Cir.
1998) (discussing advertising of gambling and lotteries); Valley Broad. Co. v. United States, 107
F.3d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing advertising of casino gambling); Chesapeake and
Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 186 (4th Cir. 1994) (discussing a cable operating
system).
13 2 .See Moser, 46 F.3d at 972.
133. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252, 259 (Supp. 1111997).
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are met.14 On May 8, 1998, U.S. West became eligible under the Tele-
com Act to begin selling long distance services.' As a result of the
Tenth Circuit's ruling, U.S. West may use its CPNI to market its long
distance services to its broad, local service customer base. By striking
down the FCC's regulations, the court permits U.S. West to enjoy a sig-
nificant market advantage over its long distance rivals.
Additionally, in its Central Hudson analysis, the Tenth Circuit does
not properly appreciate the asserted government's interests. First, the
court misapprehends that the government's interest in promoting compe-
tition in telecommunications and its interest in protecting proprietary
customer information are competing interests. Similar to access to other
telecommunications facilities, unrestrained use of CPNI by all carriers
would promote competition. However, this would severely curtail the
government's ability to protect consumers. Once CPNI were in the
stream of commerce, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for a
consumer to halt its use or dissemination. As a result, the FCC regula-
tions tried to strike a balance between these interests by restraining carri-
ers from using CPNI across categories while permitting its use without
approval for related services.
III. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decision in U.S. West struck the FCC's CPNI
regulations promulgated pursuant to section 222 of the Telecom Act.
However, the court improperly characterized CPNI as commercial
speech. Moreover, even if characterized as commercial speech, CPNI
regulations were constitutional because they were carefully crafted to
further the government's interest in protecting customer privacy and
promoting competition in the telecommunications industry.
Leah E. Capritta
134. See id. § 271.
135. See generally Leyla Kokmen, Telephone Alliance to Net 'U.S. Qwest'? Local Server
Strikes Long-distance Deal, DENVER POST, May 8, 1998, at Al.
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